Brooklyn law school david reiss how to#

“A clinical experience is one of self-discovery.”Īs a law student, Sarah Lora ’02 had three pivotal clinical experiences.

Brooklyn law school david reiss how to#

“Clinics aren’t necessarily about learning law they’re about learning how to use the law,” said Grose. Then, in 2006, she joined the faculty of Mitchell Hamline School of Law in St. She landed her first teaching job at the University of Connecticut in 1999 that was followed by two years at American University as a practitioner-in-residence for the Women and Law Clinic.

District Judge Whitman Knapp in the Southern District of New York and received a Skadden Fellowship to practice family law at Western Massachusetts Legal Services. “From my experience in the Brooklyn Law School clinical program, I found my vocation,” she said. While the experience confirmed that she didn’t want to be in a courtroom, she discovered that she loved clinical teaching. She was surprised when Kotkin asked her to be, despite Grose’s hesitation, a teaching assistant for the clinic the following year. What she discovered instead was that she “did not particularly like appearing in court.” While this is a radical solution and one that would have been considered politically na¿ve until the recent credit crisis, it is now a serious option that should garner additional attention once its rationale is set forth.In her second year of law school, Carolyn Grose ’94 hoped the Federal Litigation Clinic, run by Professors Minna Kotkin and Kathleen Sullivan, would help her determine her career options in public interest law. They should be privatized so that they can compete on an even playing field with other financial institutions and their public functions should be assumed by pure government actors. Once analyzed in the context of regulatory theory, Fannie and Freddie's future seems clear. Regulatory theory thereby clarifies how Fannie and Freddie have relied upon their hybrid public/private structure to obtain and protect economic rents at the expense of taxpayers as well as Fannie and Freddie's competitors. The federal government's special treatment of Fannie and Freddie is an extraordinary regulatory privilege in terms of its absolute value, its impact on its competitors and its cost to the federal government. A critical insight of this body of literature is that regulatory privilege should be presumed to be inconsistent with a competitive market, unless proven otherwise. This Article employs regulatory theory to construct such a framework. Few scholars, however, have provided a framework in which to conceptualize the possibilities for reform. While the American taxpayer will be required to fund a bailout of the two companies that will be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars, the current state of affairs presents an opportunity to reform the two companies and the manner in which the residential mortgage market is structured. How the two companies should exit their conservatorship has implications that reach throughout the global financial markets and are of key importance to the future of American housing finance policy. These two massive companies are profit-driven, but as government-sponsored enterprises they also have a government-mandated mission to provide liquidity and stability to the United States mortgage market and to achieve certain affordable housing goals.

The federal government recently placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-chartered, privately owned mortgage finance companies, in conservatorship.